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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Research  on  action  understanding  in  cognitive  neuroscience  has  led to the identiﬁcation  of  a wide  “action
understanding  network”  mainly  encompassing  parietal  and  premotor  cortical  areas.  Within  this  cortical
network  mirror  neurons  are  critically  involved  implementing  a  neural  mechanism  according  to  which,
during  action  understanding,  observed  actions  are  reﬂected  in  the motor  patterns  for  the  same  actions
of  the  observer.  We  suggest  that  focusing  only  on  cortical  areas  and  processes  could  be too  restrictive  to
explain  important  facets  of  action  understanding  regarding,  for example,  the  inﬂuence  of  the observer’s
motor  experience,  the  multiple  levels  at  which  an observed  action  can  be  understood,  and the  acquisition  ofirror neurons
ction understanding
ub-cortical processes
erebellar cortical loops
asal ganglia cortical loops
orward models
action understanding  ability.  In this  respect,  we  propose  that  aside  from  the  cortical  action  understanding
network,  sub-cortical  processes  pivoting  on  cerebellar  and  basal  ganglia  cortical  loops  could  crucially
support  both  the  expression  and  the  acquisition  of  action  understanding  abilities.  Within  the  paper  we
will  discuss  how  this  extended  view  can  overcome  some  limitations  of  the  “pure”  cortical  perspective,
supporting  new  theoretical  predictions  on the brain  mechanisms  underlying  action  understanding  that
could  be  tested  by future  empirical  investigations.nverse models ©  2013  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  All  rights  reserved.
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. Introduction 2004; Lestou et al., 2008; Evangeliou et al., 2009; Bonini and Ferrari,
2011). Mirror neurons were ﬁrst discovered in the monkey pre-In the last two decades, the study of action understanding in
ognitive neuroscience has been revolutionized by the discovery
f mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero,
 This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
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E-mail addresses: daniele.caligiore@istc.cnr.it (D. Caligiore),
iovanni.pezzulo@istc.cnr.it (G. Pezzulo), r.c.miall@bham.ac.uk (R.C. Miall),
ianluca.baldassarre@istc.cnr.it (G. Baldassarre).
149-7634/$ – see front matter © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.07.016motor area F5 (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti et al., 1996).
Subsequently they were also found in the inferior parietal lobe
(Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese et al., 2002), in particular in area PFG
(Rozzi et al., 2008; Bonini et al., 2010). The distinctive feature of
these neurons is that they are activated when monkeys perform
an action and also when they observe a similar action executed by
another subject. Neuroimaging evidence suggests that mirror neu-
rons might exist in homologous areas of the human brain (Buccino
et al., 2001; Grèzes et al., 2003; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998; see also
Mukamel et al., 2010 for a recent single cells recording in human
patients with intractable epilepsy).
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There is now a growing consensus that mirror neurons are
art of a wider “action understanding network” in the monkey
nd human brain which, at minimum, encompasses the bilateral
osterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) and adjacent middle and
uperior temporal gyri (MTG, STG, respectively), the inferior pari-
tal lobule (IPL), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), dorsal premotor cortex
PMd) and ventral premotor cortex (PMv) (Grafton and Tipper,
012; Caspers et al., 2010; Cattaneo and Rizzolatti, 2009; Rizzolatti
nd Craighero, 2004). Within this cortical network, one hypothesis
s that mirror neurons implement a “direct resonance” or “direct
atching” mechanism according to which the observed action is
reﬂected” in the motor patterns for the same action of the observer
Buccino et al., 2004; Uithol et al., 2011). A related hypothesis, called
simulation theory” (Gallese and Goldman, 1998), is that embod-
ed simulations support the encoding of perceived actions based
n one’s own motor repertoire (see also Prinz, 2006; Pezzulo, 2011;
ezzulo et al., 2013; Wilson and Knoblich, 2005; Wolpert et al., 2003
or related theories emphasizing prediction).
Three main issues feed the discussion about the limits of the
irror mechanism in explaining action understanding. First, how
o the motor abilities of the observer and the environmental con-
traints contribute to action understanding? Both the cortical direct
atching hypothesis and the simulation theory suggest that action
omprehension crucially relies on the ability to produce the same
ction. However, these mechanisms alone might not be sufﬁcient
o support the understanding of actions that the perceiving agent
annot produce (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Press et al., 2011a).
s an alternative to simulation theory, the “teleological theory”
onnected to it describes action understanding as an inferential
rocess that operates over the target goal and the environmen-
al constraints (contextual information) that might facilitate or
imit the goal achievement. Although the result of this process
ay  activate the motor system, the process in itself depends on
on-motor mechanisms and then extends naturally to actions out-
ide the motor repertoire of the perceiver agent (Csibra, 2003).
n the same line, others have proposed that motor phenomena
uring action observation could be epiphenomenal rather than
ausal, and that detecting motor system activity during action
bservation does not license the conclusion that motor system is
ausally involved in action understanding (Mahon and Caramazza,
008). They claim that it might be equally plausible that action
nderstanding involves mainly perceptual processes and that, once
ction is understood, it activates the motor system which provides
he information on how to (eventually) perform the action.
Second, the cortical mirror mechanism conceived as direct-
atching and the simulation theory alone might not be sufﬁcient
o account for the different levels at which an observed action can
e understood (Ramnani and Miall, 2004; Kilner, 2011). Action
epresentations in the brain, indeed, are organized at multiple hier-
rchical levels and, as a consequence, there are multiple levels at
hich the observer could understand them (Hamilton and Grafton,
007; Thill et al., 2013). As one moves up the hierarchy, the action
s represented in more abstract terms (Kilner et al., 2007; Kilner,
011; Pezzulo and Dindo, 2011). In particular, the kinematic aspects
f a movement related to the trajectory and to the velocity and the
otor aspects related to the muscle activity could be considered
t the bottom of the action representations hierarchy, whereas the
spects related to the goal of the action (the purpose of the action,
.g., grasp an object) and to the intention of the action (the over-
ll reason, e.g., grasp an object to eat) could be considered at the
op of the hierarchy. A clear hypothesis on how the mirror neu-
ons deal with action understanding at any level of complexity of
ction representation is still missing (Kilner, 2011). In the past some
uthors suggested a classiﬁcation of mirror neurons based on dif-
erent aspects of action representations analyzing the single neuron
ctivation in primates. Gallese and colleagues (Gallese et al., 1996),vioral Reviews 37 (2013) 2504–2515 2505
for example, recorded the electrical activity from 532 neurons in
the rostral part of inferior area 6 (area F5) of two macaque monkeys
and used as a classiﬁcation criterion the congruence between the
executed and observed motor acts effective in triggering them,
to split the mirror neurons into two main classes: strictly con-
gruent and broadly congruent mirror neurons. Strictly congruent
mirror neurons discharge when the observed and executed effec-
tive motor acts are identical both in terms of goal (e.g., grasping)
and in terms of the way in which that goal is achieved (e.g., pre-
cision grip), whereas to be triggered broadly congruent mirror
neurons require similarity but not identity between the observed
and executed effective motor acts (Fabbri-Destro and Rizzolatti,
2008; Gallese et al., 1996). Some authors suggest that within the
mirror circuit premotor and parietal areas could be respectively
involved in the dissociable processing of abstract goals and move-
ment representation at the kinematic level (Iacoboni et al., 2001;
Iacoboni, 1999), whereas others suggest processing of action goals
independent of motor trajectories in the parietal cortex (Fogassi
et al., 2005; Hamilton and Grafton, 2006) and unexpected inten-
tional actions in the STS (Saxe et al., 2004; Pelphrey et al., 2004).
Molnar-Szakacs et al. (2006), for example, used fMRI to investi-
gate the role of the fronto-parietal human mirror neuron system
in representing hierarchical complexity during the observation of
object-directed action sequences. They found that activity in mir-
ror neuron areas varied according to the motoric complexity of the
observed actions, but not according to the developmental sequence
of action structures. Their results show how the fronto-parietal mir-
ror neuron system provides a fairly accurate simulation process of
observed actions, mimicking internally the level of motoric com-
plexity. Finally, a further proposal suggests a two-pathway model
to understand more abstract actions (those related to goals and
intentions) that also involves ventral regions beside the traditional
mirror circuit (Kilner, 2011; Press et al., 2011b). According to this
view multiple possible actions are selected and processed during
action observation, but one is represented more strongly than the
others.
A third important issue regards the acquisition of the action
understanding capacity. This point is crucial since a substantial part
of the mirror circuit functioning might be related to the need to sup-
port the acquisition of action understanding ability and not only its
expression. This claim is in line with the general idea that much of
the structure and organization of the brain depends on the fact that
behaviour has to be acquired, and not only expressed (Büchel et al.,
1999; Xu et al., 2009; Bassett et al., 2010; Anderson, 2010; Caligiore
et al., 2010).
The associative sequence learning model (ASL) proposes that we
are not born with a mirror neuron system (Heyes, 2010). Rather, the
mirror properties of mirror neurons emerge through sensorimotor
associative learning where the natural correlation between obser-
vation of an action and its execution establishes excitatory links
between sensory and motor representations of the same action. In
this way, representations that were originally motor become mir-
ror, that is activated when observing and executing the same action.
According to the ASL hypothesis mirror neurons, as a by-product
of associative learning, could play a part in action understanding
but they do not develop for action understanding (Heyes, 2010;
Press et al., 2011b). In contrast, some authors have recently pro-
posed that the ASL hypothesis could support an explicit role of
mirror neurons in action understanding if the hypothesis is con-
sidered within the predictive coding (PC) framework (Kilner et al.,
2007; Urgesi et al., 2007). The PC proposal pivots on the hierarchi-
cal anatomical and functional organization of the cortical mirror
circuit (STS, PFG, F5; Fig. 1a). According to the PC hypothesis, the
activity within one level of the hierarchical organization of actions
within the mirror circuit (Hamilton and Grafton, 2007) acts as a
prior constraint on sub-ordinate levels. For example, contextual
2506 D. Caligiore et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 37 (2013) 2504–2515
Fig. 1. (a) Internal models within the mirror circuit. During action observation the circuit linking STS to F5 (STS-PFG-F5, solid arrows) may  work as an inverse model,
whereas during action execution the converse route from F5 to STS (F5-PFG-STS, dashed arrows) may  act as a forward model (Miall, 2003). The inverse (b) and forward (c)
models circuits within the mirror circuit and involving the cerebellum (CB). (d) Selection network within the mirror circuit involving basal ganglia (BG) and prefrontal cortex
( ror ci
(  a bid
c
w
m
m
t
a
t
t
t
b
i
m
a
a
c
B
(
f
dPFC).  The basal ganglia–cortical loops underlies actions competition within the mir
large-head arrows). The basal ganglia also communicates with cerebellum through
ues generate a prior expectation about the goal of the person
e are observing. This prior expectation allows us to predict their
otor commands, which in turn allow us to predict their kine-
atics on the basis of our own action system. The comparison of
hese predicted kinematics with the observed kinematics gener-
tes a prediction error that is used to update our representation of
he person’s motor commands. The prediction error is sent back to
he higher level of action representation to update it. Ultimately
he inferred goals are updated by minimizing the prediction error
etween the predicted and inferred motor commands. By minimiz-
ng the prediction error at all the action representation levels of the
irror circuit, the most likely cause of the action will be inferred
t all levels (intentions, goals, motor commands, kinematics). This
pproach provides an hypothesis on how the cause of an action
an be inferred from its observation (see also Friston et al., 2011).
oth ASL and PC accounts are framed considering cortical processes
Press et al., 2011b) that alone might not fully support important
unctions required by those proposals (e.g., computation of a pre-
iction error and learning based on its minimization).rcuit (small-head arrows) whereas the PFC supplies the bias signal to select actions
irectional channel (dashed arrows).
In this article we  propose that the three open issues we
have discussed above could be better addressed considering the
crucial role of sub-cortical processes underlying action understand-
ing. Mirror mechanisms responsible for action understanding are,
indeed, mainly studied at cortical levels almost ignoring how
key sub-cortical areas, which strongly work in concert with sev-
eral cortical regions including the regions forming the mirror
circuit, could contribute to the functioning and to the forma-
tion of the mirror processes for action understanding. Here we
will analyze the sub-cortical processes behind action under-
standing, pivoting on recent anatomical and functional evidence
about the involvement of the cerebellum and the basal gan-
glia in motor and non-motor functions (Strick et al., 2009; Ito,
2008; Houk, 2011). The cerebellum and basal ganglia receive
input from and send output to the cerebral cortex through
multisynaptic loops that have been assumed to be anatomi-
cally segregated and to perform distinct functional operations
(Alexander et al., 1986; Middleton and Strick, 1994, 2000; Houk
et al., 1996).
iobehavioral Reviews 37 (2013) 2504–2515 2507
m
h
m
c
u
s
s
2
f
r
M
f
i
b
r
w
s
m
C
F
t
(
F
i
p
b
e
c
u
t
a
w
2
u
h
p
s
t
e
a
c
c
1
t
v
C
m
c
r
t
S
m
e
(
e
i
Fig. 2. Sketch of the cerebellar cortical loops. The ﬁgure does not aim to supply a
detailed overview of all the cerebellar components; rather, it focuses on the main
interactions between the dentate output nuclei of the cerebellum and the target
regions of the fronto-parietal cortex. PN: pontine nuclei; Cort: cerebellar cortex;
vD:  ventral dentate nucleus of the cerebellum; dD: dorsal dentate nucleus of theD. Caligiore et al. / Neuroscience and B
After brieﬂy recalling the “traditional” cortical viewpoint of the
irror circuit, which is the starting point of our analysis, we  discuss
ow sub-cortical processes might inﬂuence the functioning of the
irror circuit (Section 2). Then we illustrate how these processes
ould contribute to the formation of the mirror circuit for action
nderstanding (Section 3). Finally, in Section 4 we draw conclu-
ions, highlighting the main points of our analysis and proposing
ome predictions for future empirical investigations.
. Sub-cortical processes affecting mirror circuit
unctioning for action understanding
An elegant and effective explanation of how the cortical mir-
or circuit could work has been given by Iacoboni et al. (2001) and
iall (2003). They suggest that during action observation the circuit
ormed by the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the area (PF) of the
nferior parietal lobe (taking into account the recent data provided
y Rozzi et al. (2008) and Bonini et al. (2010) here we consider PFG
ather that PF), and the ventral premotor cortex (F5) (STS-PFG-F5)
orks as an inverse model.  This circuit transforms the visual repre-
entation of observed action encoded by the neurons of STS into a
otor plan encoded by mirror neurons of F5 (Fig. 1a, solid arrows).
onversely, during action execution the reverse connections from
5 mirror neurons to PFG and in turn to STS work as a forward model
hat converts the motor plan back into a sensory outcome of action
i.e., a predicted visual representation encoded by neurons of STS,
ig. 1a, dashed arrows).
The cortical areas forming the mirror circuit do not work in
solation from sub-cortical structures. Rather, these areas form
artially segregated loops with corresponding areas of the cere-
ellum (Middleton and Strick, 2000) and basal ganglia (Alexander
t al., 1986). In this section we discuss how these loops might
ritically support the functioning of mirror neurons for action
nderstanding. In particular, we focus on the two issues raised in
he introduction about the role of the observer’s motor experience
nd environmental constraints, and about the multiple levels at
hich an observed action can be understood.
.1. The role of the cerebellum within the cortical action
nderstanding network
As ﬁrst highlighted by Miall in 2003 the schema shown on Fig. 1a
as an important unresolved issue. It is based on internal model
rocesses (both inverse and forward) without considering the key
ub-cortical system that plays a critical role in building and func-
ioning of internal models: the cerebellum (Miall, 2003; Wolpert
t al., 1998). To deal with this issue, Miall (2003) proposed an
lternative pathway within the mirror circuit which involves the
erebellum (Fig. 1b,c).
Thanks to the strong connections between parietal areas and the
erebellum (Schmahmann and Pandya, 1989; Stein and Glickstein,
992; Middleton and Strick, 2000) which is in turn connected to
he ventral premotor area (Strick et al., 2009), the major route for
isuo-motor information to reach F5 might include the STS-PFG-
B-F5 circuit. In this case the cerebellum might work as an inverse
odel (Fig. 1b). Moreover, the cerebellum could use the efferent
opy of motor signals sent by the primary motor cortex (M1) neu-
ons to work as a forward model,  which entails a visuo-motor update
o the motor representation within PFG (circuit F5-M1-CB-PFG-
TS on Fig. 1c). In this way the mirror neurons in F5 may  code a
otoric representation of visuo-motor actions, both during actionxecution and observation, driven by the cerebellar internal models
Fig. 1b,c). Miall’s proposal is well situated within the growing lit-
rature suggesting that the cerebellum could be crucially involved
n the brain circuits underlying action understanding processescerebellum; dlPFC: dorsal lateral areas of the PFC; PP: posterior parietal areas; PMC:
premotor cortex; M1:  primary motor areas; Ctx: cortex.
(Sokolov et al., 2010, 2012; Hamilton et al., 2006, 2007; Fuentes
and Bastian, 2007). In this line, Cattaneo et al. (2012) have recently
suggested that the role of the cerebellum as sequencer of motor acts
(Molinari et al., 2008; Strick et al., 2009) could be exploited also in
the action observation domain. They have shown that patients with
lesions of the cerebellum perform worse than healthy subjects in a
task that requires assembling pictures of individual observed motor
acts into a meaningful sequence.
The involvement of the circuits including the cerebellum
(Fig. 1b,c) might support action understanding even if the observer
lacks a motor routine of the observed action. There are at least two
ways to understand actions outside one’s own motor repertoire
that are consistent with the idea of a reuse of one’s own motor pro-
cesses and that could involve the cerebellum. The ﬁrst is the use of
forward models only (rather than also inverse models) to process
the to-be-observed actions, or the use of predictive internal models
that support perceptual exploration strategies associated to actions
(Flanagan and Johansson, 2003). This implies becoming a “visual”
(or more generally perceptual) expert without necessarily being
able to reproduce the entire action. In support of this view, it has
been suggested that forward models can be learned before inverse
models (Flanagan et al., 2003).
The second possibility, discussed by Schubotz (2008), consists
in generalizing the prediction abilities of the motor system beyond
their initial domain of acquisition, that is, beyond the prediction
of action effects. Neuroimaging studies show that premotor cortex
is involved in the prediction of perceptual events in a somatotopic
way. For example, premotor areas involved in hand movements
are active during a task requiring the prediction of the size of cir-
cles; premotor areas involved in articulation are active during a
task requiring the prediction of the pitch of a tone (Schubotz and
von Cramon, 2002; Wolfensteller et al., 2007). It is therefore possi-
ble that premotor mechanisms are reused outside action prediction
tasks as they successfully incorporate relevant statistical regulari-
ties; for example, the statistics used to predict articulation might
also be used (to some extent) to predict nonverbal auditory stimuli.
In a similar way, cerebellar mechanisms that incorporate useful
action regularities could be reused outside their initial domain of
acquisition.The cerebellum might also contribute to the issue related to the
multiple levels at which an observed action can be understood.
Many works, indeed, suggest that the cerebellum is involved in
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loop is thought to be involved in the selection of the content of
the targeted cortical areas, such as a perceptual representation, an508 D. Caligiore et al. / Neuroscience and B
he communication between cortical areas such as the occipital,
emporal and prefrontal ones, and some areas of the mirror circuit
Grèzes and Decety, 2001; Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Middleton
nd Strick, 1996; Strick et al., 2009). In this respect, some rele-
ant information is given by some aspects of cerebellar anatomy
Fig. 2). The cerebellum shares a set of discrete parallel loops with
arious parts of the fronto-parietal cerebral network (Dum and
trick, 2003; Middleton and Strick, 2000; Cisek and Kalaska, 2001;
trick et al., 2009). In particular, the output channels in the ventral
entate nucleus of the cerebellum project to the posterior parietal
ortex and to the dorsal areas of the prefrontal cortex (PFC; areas
 and 46), the latter involved in working memory and planning
nd a major site of termination of the “dorsal stream” of visual
rocessing (Dum and Strick, 2003; Middleton and Strick, 2000).
hese cortical areas targeted by the dentate output also project
ack to the cerebellum via efferents to pontine nuclei (Fig. 2; Dum
nd Strick, 2003; Schmahmann, 1998; Middleton and Strick, 1996,
000).
The cerebellar-dorsoprefrontal closed-loop circuits (Fig. 2)
ould represent a functional unit of cerebrocerebellar circuitry that
ould be important in forming and detecting high-level goals and
ntentions (see Introduction). This function is supported by the
apacity of these areas to process information from various mul-
imodal associative areas that allow them to represent and process
he environmental context (Uithol et al., 2011; Kilner, 2011; Kim
t al., 1994; Strick et al., 2009). In this respect, the PFC, working
n synergy with the cerebellum (Middleton and Strick, 2000; Ito,
008), might possess the capacity of anticipating future events
t fast temporal scales based on forward models (Wolpert et al.,
995). Thus, if we consider goals and intentions as desired antici-
ated states (Matsumoto and Tanaka, 2004; Thill et al., 2013), the
apacity of PFC to project into the future is an important prerequi-
ite for the formation and detection of goals, as well as for biasing
he activation of actions related to those goals within the mirror
ircuit.
The cerebellar-parietal loops supporting the coordination of
ction execution (Ramnani et al., 2001), might also play a role
uring action observation. In this case the signal coming from the
entral dentate output of the cerebellum might support the coor-
ination between the dorsal areas of the PFC and the posterior
arietal areas to represent high-level goals taking into account
he temporal relationship between task-relevant events (D’Angelo
nd Casali, 2013). This view is in line with the “timing hypothe-
is” postulating that the cerebellum is critical for representing the
emporal relationship between task-relevant events (Bower, 1997;
erschure and Mintz, 2001; Jacobson et al., 2008; D’Angelo and De
eeuw, 2009; Yamazaki and Tanaka, 2009; Yamazaki and Nagao,
012) as it works as a general timing co-processor whose effect
epends on the targeted centres (see D’Angelo and Casali, 2013 for
n excellent recent overview on this topic).
Other cerebellar loops pass through the primary motor cortex
nd premotor areas. In more detail, the output channels in the dor-
al dentate nucleus of the cerebellum project to primary motor
nd premotor areas which, in turn, project back to the cerebel-
um via efferents to pontine nuclei (Fig. 2; Dum and Strick, 2003;
iddleton and Strick, 2000). The loops with primary motor cortex
re presumably involved in adjusting motor command to compen-
ate for movement dynamics, whereas the further loops passing
hrough premotor cortex, where mirror neurons are located, may
e involved in predicting the immediate consequences of speciﬁc
ntended movements (Cisek and Kalaska, 2001; Haslinger et al.,
002). The observation of mirror neurons in ventral premotor
reas (Fadiga et al., 2000) is consistent with the functions ascribed
o cerebellar-premotor closed loop circuits (Fig. 2) related to the
rediction of the immediate consequences of speciﬁc intended
ovements.vioral Reviews 37 (2013) 2504–2515
2.2. The role of the basal ganglia within the cortical action
understanding network
Beside the cerebellum, action selection mechanisms pivoting on
the basal ganglia cortical loops might support other complemen-
tary neural processes underlying the understanding of high-level
actions. To clarify this idea, a good starting point is the “affor-
dance competition” hypothesis put forward by Cisek (Cisek, 2007;
Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). According to this proposal, the parietal-
premotor circuit speciﬁes multiple action plans based on available
affordances, which compete for selection until one is chosen to be
overtly executed (Caligiore et al., 2010, 2013). Within this paral-
lel speciﬁcation and selection scheme, the dorsal stream processes
inputs from sensory stimuli and contributes to the speciﬁcation
of action and to preparatory motor processing. The ventral stream
recognizes object identities and elicits associated internal motiva-
tional and affective processes based on amygdala, PFC, and ventral
portions of the basal ganglia (see Yin and Knowlton, 2006 and
Mirolli et al., 2010). In turn, this permits behavioural biasing and
the evaluation of the concurrent motor plans.
Selection mechanisms such as those described by the affordance
competition hypothesis might participate in managing high-level
actions understanding. In more detail, during action observation
multiple possible actions are processed but only few are repre-
sented more strongly than the others and are selected (Kilner,
2011). The selection among neural representations of many differ-
ent actions within F5 and PFG (Fogassi et al., 2005; Hamilton and
Grafton, 2007; Chersi et al., 2011; Dindo et al., 2011) could be driven
by a bias signal generated by PFC, whose neurons encode goals
and intentions (Thill et al., 2013). In this way  goals and intentions
might be actually translated into speciﬁc actions via a strong bias
exerted onto representations encoded by mirror neurons within
F5 and PFG. The selection process leads to a competition among
different actions within F5 and PFG, based on reciprocal inhibi-
tion of competing neural populations, and this competition might
take place within whole circuits formed by basal ganglia-cortical
loops (Redgrave et al., 1999a, 1999b; Kandel et al., 2000; Cisek and
Kalaska, 2005). Fig. 1d shows BG-F5 and BG-PFG circuits under-
lying the integration of information from various sources (Weber
and Yin, 1984; Glickstein, 2003) and supporting PFC signals to drive
action selection mechanisms (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Pezzulo and
Castelfranchi, 2009).
Analyzing the hierarchical anatomical and functional organiza-
tion of the basal ganglia-cortical loops could be crucial to explain
how the action selection mechanisms operate. In more detail, three
distinct functional domains can be distinguished within the basal
ganglia corresponding to the dorsolateral striatum (DLS), dorso-
medial striatum (DMS), and ventral striatum (VS), the latter also
called the nucleus accumbens (Fig. 3) (Yin and Knowlton, 2006;
Baldassarre et al., in press). Such domains are identiﬁable in rats and
mice and are homologues to respectively the putamen, caudatum,
and nucleus accumbens in primate striatum. These different loops
run in parallel and each loop starts from a cortical area, goes through
a subregion of the basal ganglia, and goes back to the cortical area of
origin via the thalamus, forming distinct multiple re-entrant loops
interacting with distinct portions of cortex, including the areas of
the mirror circuit (Alexander et al., 1986; Humphries and Prescott,
2010; Middleton and Strick, 2000; Romanelli et al., 2005). Within
each one of these streams there is evidence of the existence of
relatively segregated channels capable of selecting particular cor-
tical restricted targets (Chevalier and Deniau, 1990; Gurney et al.,
2001; Mink, 1996). In particular, based on these channels, eachaction, or a goal (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Redgrave et al.,
1999b).
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The distinct loops typically play different functional roles
epending on the type of information processed within the targeted
ortex, and on this basis are also respectively called the sensorimo-
or, associative and limbic loops (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Fig. 3).
he cortical areas that reciprocate connections with the nucleus
ccumbens are the ventro-medial, orbitofrontal, and dorsolateral
ortions of the PFC, important for the processing of biologically
alient states and outcomes (Humphries and Prescott, 2010; Voorn
t al., 2004; Zahm, 2000). In general, the limbic loop is involved in
he selection of ﬁnal goals (e.g., the achievement of a certain food),
nd means-to-end goals (e.g., opening a door to access a lever acti-
ating a food dispenser), based on motivations. The limbic loop is
lso important for reward and motivation based on dopamine reg-
lation (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Corbit and Balleine, 2011).
The cortical areas that reciprocate connections with the cau-
atum are the temporal cortex (Middleton and Strick, 1996), the
arietal cortex, the frontal eye-ﬁelds, and the dorsal regions of the
FC (Alexander et al., 1986; Voorn et al., 2004). The associative loop
s involved in the formation of high-level visual representations
typically processed in temporal areas; Middleton and Strick, 1996),
n attention, spatial orientation, and affordance selection (involving
rontal eye ﬁeld and parietal areas, Schrimsher et al., 2002; Volkow
t al., 2007), and in working memory tasks (involving various areas
f the PFC; Levy et al., 1997; Lewis et al., 2004).
Finally, the putamen is in a sensorimotor loop with motor cor-
ex (MC), premotor cortex (PMC), and supplementary motor cortex
SMC) (Romanelli et al., 2005; Tang et al., 2007). There is clear evi-
ence that the sensorimotor loop is involved in the selection of ﬁnal
ensorimotor mappings based on the current context (Alexander
t al., 1986; Romanelli et al., 2005; Yin and Knowlton, 2006).
The three striato-cortical loops form a functional hierarchy (Yin
nd Knowlton, 2006; Baldassarre et al., in press). Each loop col-
ects a rich set of information from various cortical areas and on
his basis selects the contents processed in a speciﬁc target cortical
rea within this hierarchy. The decisions about motor actions, sup-
orted by the sensorimotor loop, are at a lower level with respect
o the decisions about the part of the current context the animal
hould attend and process, which relies on the associative loop. In
heir turn, the latter decisions are at a lower level with respect to
ecisions about the motivationally salient outcomes (the high level
oals of the animal) processed by the limbic loop. The selection
rocesses performed by basal ganglia have an increasing impor-
ance (e.g., in terms of neural resources involved and in turn in
erms of neural activation) going towards the higher levels of thedard arrows indicate excitatory glutamate connections. Flat arrowheads indicate
s dashed arrows indicate cross-loop connections. Reprinted with permission from
ght 2006.
hierarchy. Thus, at the highest level of the hierarchy the VS,
supplied with rich information on value of stimuli by various
sub-cortical areas (e.g., amigdala, hippocampus, hypothalamus),
contributes to select biologically relevant goals encoded in the
orbitofrontal, dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortices. At
a lower level, the DMS  contributes to select more abstract goals
encoded in the dorsolateral PFC. At the lowest level, the DLS selects
motor plans, encoded in PMC, and action implementation pro-
cesses, encoded in the primary motor cortex. Importantly, this
functional hierarchy is supported by a top-down parallel anatom-
ical hierarchy involving the so called striato-nigro-striatal spirals
that start from the accumbens, continue through the caudatum,
and terminate in the putamen, and that are important to transfer
motivational information related to goals and homeostatic drives
processed in the limbic loop downstream to the associative and
sensorimotor loops (Haber et al., 2000; see also Fig. 3).
The output of the basal ganglia could also inﬂuence higher order
levels of visual processing. Basal ganglia could support STS cells to
respond selectively to the observed body movements. STS is indeed
a source of input to the basal ganglia, but also their target (Fig. 1d;
Maioli et al., 1983; Middleton and Strick, 1996). The same connec-
tion pattern repeat for the temporal lobes. As a consequence of the
inﬂuence of the basal ganglia, the areas of temporal lobes might fur-
ther elaborate the visual signals to better identify the object identity
(cf. Cisek, 2007; Caligiore et al., 2010; Thill et al., 2013). Within the
mirror system, the visual input concerning biological motion com-
ing from STS is mainly fed to PFG, where mirror neurons are mostly
present, and to AIP (Rozzi et al., 2006; Nelissen et al., 2011). During
action observation the neurons of area STS respond selectively to
a range of body movements (Oram and Perrett, 1994; Grossman
et al., 2000; Hoffman and Haxby, 2000; Keysers and Perrett, 2004;
Oztop and Arbib, 2002) and this function might be supported by the
selection mechanisms conveyed by the basal ganglia-STS circuits,
as suggested by their anatomy and functionalities, based on the
pattern of repeated striato-thalamo-cortical loops described above.
Including the selection processes of basal ganglia within the
mirror circuit might also help to interpret recent fMRI data which
show that mirror neurons are modulated by the motivational state
(Cheng et al., 2007). These data show how human participants who
observe grasping actions directed at food exhibit a higher activa-
tion of premotor and parietal mirror areas when they are hungry
than when they are satiated, indicating that the mirror system is
sensitive to the needs and drives of the participants. Moreover, the
same scans show a higher activation of orbitofrontal cortex as well
2510 D. Caligiore et al. / Neuroscience and Biobeha
Fig. 4. Schema of the neural circuits proposed to be mainly involved in action
understanding processes. The dashed black arrow indicate the hyper direct path-
way  linking the subthalamic nucleus (STN) with the cortex (Ctx). The dashed gray
arrows indicate the circuits interconnecting basal ganglia and cerebellum: an output
stage of cerebellar processing, the dentate nucleus (DN), has a disynaptic connection
with an input stage of basal ganglia processing, the striatum (Str) (Hoshi et al., 2005);
there is also a reciprocal connection from the STN to the input stage of cerebellar
processing, via pontine nuclei (PN), the cerebellar cortex (Cort) (Bostan et al., 2010,
2013). These interconnections enable two-way communication between the basal
ganglia and cerebellum. Each of these subcortical modules receives signals from
several areas of cerebral cortex through separate parallel channels (parallel solid
black arrows) and sends signals (through Thalamus) to the cerebral cortex. The gray
arrows and the black lines ending with a ﬁlled circle represent excitatory gluta-
matergic and inhibitory GABAergic projections, respectively. GPi, internal segment
of  the globus pallidus; GPe, external segment of the globus pallidus; SNr, substantia
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1igra pars reticulata. Some aspects of the schema arrangement are based on the
roposals and results presented in Nambu et al. (2002), Hoshi et al. (2005), Bostan
t  al. (2010, 2013), and Baldassarre et al. (in press).
s amygdala and hippocampus. This indicates that the orbitofrontal
ortex, the PFC area connected with sub-cortical limbic systems
uch as amygdala and hippocampus known to interface the brain
ith the visceral body, might be the origin of the observed mod-
lation of mirror neuron activity. The selection among alternative
ppetitive outcomes on the basis of current needs and motivational
tates, which pivots on the limbic basal ganglia-cortical loop, might
e the mechanism underlying the observed modulation of mirror
eurons activity.
.3. Basal ganglia-cerebellar-cortical neural circuits underlying
ction understanding
Pivoting on recent data on the anatomical and functional orga-
ization of basal ganglia and cerebellum and on their interactions
ith mirror cortical areas, we propose a novel schema on the
ortical-subcortical neural circuits that might be involved in action
nderstanding. In more detail, our perspective is mainly based on
he neural circuits comprising the subthalamic nucleus (STN) of
he basal ganglia (Alegre et al., 2010; Marceglia et al., 2009), the
eciprocal disynaptic pathways between the basal ganglia and the
erebellum (Hoshi et al., 2005; Bostan et al., 2010, 2013), and the
ub-cortical loops these areas form with the mirror cortical areas
see Section 2). Fig. 4 summarizes the connectivity between these
reas.
The STN is part of the closed ancillary loop in the basal gan-
lia circuitry including the external globus pallidus (GPe). The
triatum (Str) is the input part of the basal ganglia receiving
irect excitatory cortical inputs. Str projects to the output nuclei
f the basal ganglia formed by the internal globus pallidus (GPi)
nd the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr) through two major
rojection pathways (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Albin et al.,
989). The ﬁrst pathway (”direct pathway”) arises from GABAergicvioral Reviews 37 (2013) 2504–2515
striatal neurons, and projects monosynaptically to the GPi/SNr. The
second pathway (”indirect pathway”) arises from GABAergic stri-
atal neurons, and projects polysynaptically to the GPi/SNr by way
of a sequence of connections involving the GPe and STN. In this
way, STN assumes a crucial position as a relay nucleus of this sec-
ond pathway. Importantly, STN could be regarded as another input
station of the basal ganglia besides the Str as it receives direct corti-
cal projections, especially from the frontal lobe (Nambu, 2004) and
sends outputs to the GPi/SNr (“hyper-direct” pathway; Fig. 4).
Cortical activity triggered in the mirror circuit by movement
observation may  therefore easily propagate to the basal ganglia
and, in particular, to the STN through these pathways. Recent evi-
dence supports this view (Alegre et al., 2010; Marceglia et al.,
2009; Castiello et al., 2009). The input from mirror cortical activity,
reﬂected in the changes observed in the STN local ﬁeld potentials
(Alegre et al., 2010), might serve to modulate basal ganglia out-
put according to the predicted or more likely outcome in terms
of action. The basal ganglia output might in turn modulate the
response of the mirror cortical circuits during action observation
(Marceglia et al., 2009). This modulation pivots on the selection
mechanisms supported by the activation of STN and might be
necessary for the deployment of additional activity which could
be necessary to inﬂuence cortical functions related to the repre-
sentations of observed actions (Alegre et al., 2010; Castiello et al.,
2009).
The management of the timing of the communication between
the STN and the premotor areas is a critical point highlighted in
the literature (Marceglia et al., 2009). In this respect, we propose
that the cerebellum might assist this communication by providing
accurate timing of series of signals coming from the cerebral cor-
tex and the basal ganglia. The cerebellar-cortical loops discussed
above, indeed, might be involved in the time integration of the cur-
rent, memorized, and predicted sensory information in order to
allow effective action selection (Cisek and Kalaska, 2001; D’Angelo
and Casali, 2013). In this perspective it might be also important
to consider recent empirical literature providing data about the
anatomical substrate for a bidirectional communication between
basal ganglia and cerebellum (Fig. 4 and also Fig. 1d, dashed arrows;
Hoshi et al., 2005; Bostan et al., 2010, 2013). The STN of the basal
ganglia has an important disynaptic projection to the cerebel-
lar cortex. This pathway provides a means for signals from the
basal ganglia to inﬂuence cerebellar function (Bostan et al., 2010).
Moreover, the dentate nucleus of the cerebellum has a disynaptic
projection to the main input stage of basal ganglia, the striatum
(Hoshi et al., 2005). These recently discovered bidirectional com-
munication channels between the cerebellum and the basal ganglia
might also support the timing functions of the cerebellum. In gen-
eral, this view is in line with the timing hypothesis discussed above
in Section 2, according to which the cerebellum could be seen as a
general timing co-processor whose effect depends on the targeted
centres (D’Angelo and Casali, 2013).
Remarkably, the schema showed on Fig. 4 could be used to
explain recent data suggesting that the inﬂuence of the mirror
system on the facilitation of voluntary movements is altered in
Parkinson’s disease (PD) (Tremblay et al., 2008; Castiello et al.,
2009). In general, visual stimuli facilitate the execution of voluntary
movements in PD and this facilitation occurs both with “biological”
movement observation and with action-related objects observa-
tion (Poliakoff et al., 2007). However, in a task where PD patients
had to react to the observation of an action which they were subse-
quently requested to perform, they showed facilitation effects only
when the subject they observed was  a Parkinsonian patient, that is
when the observed action matched the action they could perform.
When the patients observed a healthy subject (non matching con-
dition), the facilitation effects disappeared (Castiello et al., 2009). In
such circumstances, damage to the structures shown in Fig. 4 might
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revent the deployment of additional activity which might be nec-
ssary to inﬂuence cortical functions related to the representations
f observed actions.
. The role of subcortical processes in the development of
he mirror circuit for action understanding
How does action understanding develop within the mirror cir-
uit? This is a cardinal question which needs to be addressed. The
hole organization and functioning of the mirror circuit might,
ndeed, be related to the need to support the acquisition of action
nderstanding behaviour and not only its expression (Caligiore
t al., 2010).
The combination of the associative sequence learning model (ASL)
nd predictive coding (PC) account offers a possible answer to this
uestion. Once mirror neurons are acquired by an ASL process, the
C process uses information supplied by the mirror neurons about
hich goals are most likely given a certain intention, and which
inematics are most likely given a certain goal, to test hypothe-
es about the observed actors’ actions. In this way, the description
f a behaviour at one level within the brain hierarchy acts as a
rior constraint on subordinate levels. The mismatch error between
xpectations and observations at each level is at the basis of the
earning of the forward models incorporated in the hierarchy.
Both ASL and PC models mainly refer to cortical mechanisms
Press et al., 2011b) that, alone, might not be sufﬁcient to sup-
ort the development of mirror neurons for action understanding
e.g., the computation of a prediction error and learning based on
ts minimization). In this section we will see that including sub-
ortical processes pivoting on basal ganglia- and cerebellar-cortical
oops crucially reﬁnes and develops the ASL and PC theories under
 number of aspects, brieﬂy discussed below.
Beyond associative learning to acquire action understanding capac-
ty. In agreement with the ASL perspective a simple account of the
evelopment of the mirror mechanism suggests that plasticity of
onnections between the three core cortical areas of the mirror
ircuit, STS, PFG, and F5 is regulated by a Hebbian associative mech-
nism (Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Chersi et al., 2011). However,
ction understanding is a complex process including both motor
nd cognitive aspects of behaviour; hence it is unlikely that it devel-
ps based only on simple Hebbian associative learning (Press et al.,
011b). The acquisition of the action understanding capacity by
irror neurons (e.g., to minimize prediction errors according to the
C hypothesis) might require that the associative Hebbian learn-
ng process is paralleled by more powerful learning processes, in
articular by supervised learning.
In this respect, it might be important to consider the proposal
ccording to which the brain organization is based on three major
ivisions distinguished by the learning algorithms they implement
Doya, 2000; see also Shadmehr and Krakauer, 2008; Izawa and
hadmehr, 2011): (a) the cerebral cortex, learning based on unsu-
ervised associative mechanisms (mainly of Hebbian type); (b) the
erebellum, learning based on supervised learning; and (c) the basal
anglia, learning based on trial-and-error processes (reinforcement
earning). As cortical areas work in concert with cerebellar and
asal ganglia structures, we suggest that the development of action
nderstanding is based not only on the unsupervised Hebbian cor-
ical learning processes but also on cerebellar supervised learning
nd basal ganglia trial-and-error learning.
Basal ganglia-cortical loops support action selection needed by pre-
ictive coding. The PC account suggests that one level within the
ierarchical organization of actions (Hamilton and Grafton, 2007)
cts as a prior constraint on sub-ordinate levels. The contextual
ues used to generate a prior expectation about the intention of an
bserved actor bias the selection of an action at lower levels withinvioral Reviews 37 (2013) 2504–2515 2511
the hierarchical organization of actions. The biasing contextual cues
might be conveyed by PFC, whereas the selection of an action within
level might be based on a dynamical competition among different
actions encoded within F5 and PFG. The competition depends on
reciprocal inhibition of competing clusters, representing different
actions, which might be supported by whole systems formed by
the basal ganglia-F5 and basal ganglia-PFG loops (Fig. 1d; Redgrave
et al., 1999a; Cisek and Kalaska, 2005).
Cerebellar-cortical loops support “Predictive Coding programs”,
computing and minimizing prediction errors. According to the PC
framework the activity within one level of the hierarchical organi-
zation of action within the mirror circuit predicts representations
in the level below, via the forward model circuit involving F5-PFG-
STS (Fig. 1a, dashed arrows and cf. Press et al., 2011b). For example,
a prior expectation about the goal of the observed person allows
an observer to predict the motor commands that the person will
perform, which in turn allows the agent to predict the related kine-
matics. These predictions are compared with the representations at
the subordinate action level to produce a prediction error. This pre-
diction error is then sent back up to the higher level, via the inverse
model circuit STS-PF-F5 (Fig. 1a, solid arrows), to update action
representation at this higher level. For example, the comparison of
the predicted kinematics with the observed kinematics generates a
prediction error that is used to update the representation of the per-
son’s motor commands. By minimizing the prediction error at all
levels of action representation within the mirror system, the most
likely cause of the action will be inferred at all levels. Thus, ulti-
mately the inferred goals are updated by minimizing the prediction
error between the predicted and inferred motor commands.
The associative Hebbian mechanisms within the cortical areas
STS, PFG, F5 might not be suitable to generate and minimize pre-
diction errors as required by the PC hypothesis. Rather, both the
production and the minimization of the prediction error might
involve cerebellar cortical loops and supervised learning processes
working in synergy with associative cortical processes (Doya, 2000;
Houk, 2011; Shadmehr and Krakauer, 2008; Izawa and Shadmehr,
2011). In this line, we propose that the cerebellar forward/inverse
circuits (Fig. 1b,c) might be ﬁrstly involved in implementing the
PC processes leading to the acquisition of the action understanding
capacity by the mirror neurons. The supervised learning processes
pivoting on cerebellum, indeed, might contribute to the minimi-
zation of the prediction errors at all level of action representation.
This account suggests that the supervised learning pivoting on
cerebellar circuits might allow both cerebellar (Fig. 1b,c) and corti-
cal forward and inverse models (Fig. 1a) to acquire the PC programs
(i.e., the processes computing and minimizing the prediction errors
given a certain context). During practice, as the PC programs are
acquired, they are transferred to premotor and parietal areas for
more efﬁcient and faster execution (Hua and Houk, 1997; Koziol
et al., in press). This transfer process might work as an automati-
zation process, according to which the cerebellum exports some
routine cognitive functions to the cerebral cortex to improve the
efﬁciency of behaviour and thought (Hua and Houk, 1997; Koziol
et al., in press; and see Raichle et al., 1994, for PET studies showing
that metabolic activity associated with a cognitive task moves from
the cerebellum to cortex with practice). Thus, once the main PC
programs are acquired they could be executed by cortical premo-
tor and parietal areas whereas the cerebellar circuits might remain
important as a “reservoir” of PC programs. The enormous stor-
age capacity of the cerebellum (Tyrrell and Willshaw, 1992; Hua
and Houk, 1997) might support this function of the cerebellar cir-
cuits. According to this view not only do anticipatory control loops
between cerebellum and cortical areas support actions processes,
but they also permanently structure and sculpt cortical representa-
tions (Koziol et al., in press). Once the learning process related to a
speciﬁc forward/inverse model in cortical circuits is determinated
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Fig. 1a), cortex is able to work without further involvement of the
erebellar-cortical forward/inverse circuits (Fig. 1b,c). Elimination
f cerebellar involvement is advantageous as it shortens the con-
rol pathway for responses that are used frequently, thus forming
hat has been referred to as “sensorimotor habits” (Hua and Houk,
997). This shift in function from cerebellum to cortex could be a
otential source of confounds in the empirical study on the role of
erebellum in the mirror circuit functioning.
Cerebellar cortical loops support the detection of others’ actions.
etecting that an observed action is performed by another individ-
al is a ﬁrst step that the observer must take during the acquisition
f action understanding. The cerebellum might give an important
ontribution to this process by updating the perceptual predictions
bout the sensory consequences of one’s own action. This func-
ion is accomplished by comparing internal predictions about the
ensory consequences of our own actions with the actual affer-
nce, thereby isolating the afferent component that is externally
roduced (Wolpert et al., 1998; Haarmeier et al., 2001). The cerebel-
um might mediate the updating of predictions about the sensory
onsequences of actions, ensuring both precise action performance
nd truthful perceptual interpretation of external events, including
ctions (Wolpert et al., 2003; Synofzik et al., 2008). When sen-
ory input from the environment is not due to one’s own  action
ut to an action of another individual, the cerebellum should not
pdate its perceptual predictions about the sensory consequences
f actions. In more detail, the afference is compared with an inter-
al prediction about the sensory consequences of one’s own  action
enerated by the cerebellar forward model circuit, F5-M1-CB-PFG-
TS (Fig. 1c). The internal prediction is based on signals related to
ovements, including efference copy of the motor command and
ensory information of the state of the body (Wolpert et al., 2003).
n case of a match between the internal predictions about the sen-
ory consequences of one’s own actions and afference, the afference
an be interpreted as a result of self-action (reafference). In the case
f a mismatch between the internal predictions about the sensory
onsequences of one’s own actions and afference, the difference
orresponds to an external sensory event, and any observed action
ust have been performed by another person (Frith et al., 2000;
ynofzik et al., 2008). Thus, the mismatch between the internal pre-
ictions about the sensory consequences of one’s own actions and
fference might supply a “go signal” to inform the STS-PFG-CB-F5
ircuit that the observed action is performed by another subject
nd that the predictive coding (PC) programs could start to work,
llowing the acquisition of the action understanding ability.
Modulation of associative and supervised learning based on basal
anglia dopamine regulation. We  propose that the basal ganglia
ight convey the dopamine reward signal to modulate both the
ssociative/cortical and the supervised/cerebellar learning pro-
esses underlying the acquisition of action understanding by the
irror neuron system. During cortical associative learning when
he observation of an action is correlated with its execution, an
xcitatory link between sensory and motor representations of the
ame action is built (Press et al., 2011b). During this sensorimo-
or learning the association between context, location, and physical
haracteristics of what is present in the ﬁrst experience could be
einforced to boost the strength of the excitatory link established by
he correlation between executed and observed action. The basal
anglia might participate to this reinforcement process. The basal
anglia are, indeed, the neural implementation of the “law of effect”
esponsible for sensorimotor learning that is reinforced by rewards,
ith the reward signal provided by dopamine in a gradual pro-
ess of habit formation (Yin and Knowlton, 2006). Phasic dopamine
ignals acting on targets in the basal ganglia, limbic system, and
erebral cortex are critically involved in the required reinforcement
rocess (Montague et al., 2004). The dopaminergic learning signal
s supplied by the ventral tegmental area (VTA), which is under avioral Reviews 37 (2013) 2504–2515
strong control of basal ganglia and the hippocampus. Basal ganglia
contribute to the production and modulation of dopamine learning
signals on the basis of appetitive stimuli (Schultz, 2002). Hippocam-
pus detects new information that is not already stored in long-term
memory and on this basis it releases a novelty signal which is con-
veyed to the VTA where it contributes, along with salience and
goal information, to the ﬁring of dopamine cells (Lisman and Grace,
2005). In the case of mirror neurons, the information which would
cause the release of dopamine might be represented by the obser-
vation of actions related to appetitive stimuli or to novel action
outcomes never seen before.
The dopamine reward signal modulated by the basal ganglia
might regulate learning in the cortico-cerebellar circuits as well.
This proposal is supported by the recent data providing the anatom-
ical substrate for a bidirectional communication between basal
ganglia and cerebellum, introduced in Section 2.1 (Fig. 1d, dashed
arrows; Hoshi et al., 2005; Bostan et al., 2010, 2013). We have seen
there that the subthalamic nucleus of the basal ganglia has a sub-
stantial disynaptic projection to the cerebellar cortex. This pathway
provides a means through which basal ganglia inﬂuence cerebel-
lar function (Bostan et al., 2010). Moreover, the dentate nucleus
of the cerebellum has a disynaptic projection to the main input
stage of basal ganglia processing, the striatum (Hoshi et al., 2005).
Taken together these results provide the substrate for an important
two-way communication between basal ganglia and cerebellum,
which parallels their indirect communication through the cerebral
cortex (Houk, 2011). From a learning perspective, interconnect-
ing a reinforcement learning module (pivoting on basal ganglia),
and the related reward system, with a supervised learning mod-
ule (pivoting on cerebellum) might lead to new computational
operations where the reward dopamine signal modulated by the
basal ganglia might regulate the effectiveness of supervised learn-
ing, elevating learning rates in rewarding contexts. This claim is
in agreement with recent literature suggesting that the connec-
tion between basal ganglia and cerebellum provides an anatomical
substrate for reward-related signals regulated by basal ganglia to
inﬂuence cerebellar learning (Bostan et al., 2010, 2013; Thoma et al.,
2008). Further support comes from imaging studies indicating the
most intense cerebellar activations during the acquisition phase of
conditioned forelimb movements (Milak et al., 1997), and when
sensorimotor tasks are being learned (Friston et al., 1992; Imamizu
et al., 2000).
4. Conclusion
The main message that this article conveys is that the sub-
cortical processes driven by the cerebellum and the basal ganglia
might support cortical structures, and in particular the mirror cir-
cuit, in expressing and acquiring action understanding capacities. In
particular, evidence about the involvement of the cerebellum (e.g.,
Miall, 2003; Strick et al., 2009; Ito, 2008; Houk, 2011) and the basal
ganglia (e.g., Middleton and Strick, 1994, 2000; Houk et al., 1996;
Redgrave et al., 1999b; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010) in cortical func-
tions has been used to support the idea that, within the complete
mirror system, cortical and sub-cortical structures might work in con-
cert to address three key open issues. These open issues concern
how the motor abilities of an organism might contribute to action
understanding; how mirror neurons might manage multiple lev-
els at which an observed action can be understood; and how the
action understanding capacity might be acquired. A direct conse-
quence of our proposal is that impairments of cerebellar- and/or
basal ganglia-cortical loops might lead to an impaired action under-
standing capacity, especially related to these three critical points.
For example, impairments of the basal ganglia-cortical loops for
action selection might affect the integration across the multiple
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evels at which an action can be understood, as well as action
election processes postulated by predictive coding. Similarly, the
cquisition of action understanding capacity by the mirror neuron
ystem might be impaired in cerebellar patients. Importantly, the
lausibility of predictions similar to those proposed here has been
ecently conﬁrmed by empirical studies aiming at demonstrating
he impairment of some aspects of action understanding in cere-
ellar patients (e.g., Cattaneo et al., 2012; Sokolov et al., 2012) as
ell as in Parkinsonian subjects showing damages in some func-
ions of basal ganglia (Alegre et al., 2010; Marceglia et al., 2009;
astiello et al., 2009). However, further research will be necessary
o conﬁrm these claims.
cknowledgments
This research was supported by the EU funded Projects “IM-
LeVeR–Intrinsically Motivated Cumulative Learning Versatile
obots”, contract no. FP7-IP -231722 and Goal-Leaders, contract
o. FP7-ICT-270108. R.C. Miall is funded by the Wellcome Trust,
T087554. We  thank the editor and the reviewers for their con-
tructive comments, which helped us to improve the manuscript.
eferences
legre, M., Rodríguez-Oroz, M.C., Valencia, M.,  Pérez-Alcázar, M., Guridi, J., Iriarte,
J.,  Obeso, J.A., et al., 2010. Changes in subthalamic activity during movement
observation in Parkinson’s disease: is the mirror system mirrored in the basal
ganglia? Clinical Neurophysiology 121, 414–425.
lexander, G.E., Delong, M.R., Strick, P.L., 1986. Parallel organization of functionally
segregated circuits linking basal ganglia and cortex. Annual Review of Neuro-
science 9, 357–381.
lexander, G.E., Crutcher, M.D., 1990. Functional architecture of basal ganglia cir-
cuits: neural substrates of parallel processing. Trends in Neurosciences 13,
266–271.
lbin, R.L., Young, A.B., Penney, J.B., 1989. The functional anatomy of basal ganglia
disorders. Trends in Neurosciences 12, 366–375.
nderson, M.L., 2010. Neural reuse: a fundamental organizational principle of the
brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, 245–313.
aldassarre, G., Caligiore, D., Mannella, F. in press. The hierarchical organisation
of  cortical and basal-ganglia systems: a computationally-informed review and
integrated hypothesis. In Baldassarre, G., Mirolli, M.  (Eds.), Computational and
Robotic Models of the Hierarchical Organisation of Behaviour. Springer-Verlag,
Berlin.
assett, D.S., Wymbs, N.F., Porter, M.A., Mucha, P.J., Carlson, J.M., Grafton, S.T., 2010.
Dynamic reconﬁguration of human brain networks during learning. Proceedings
of  the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108,
7641–7646.
erridge, K.C., Robinson, T.E., 1998. What is the role of dopamine in reward: hedonic
impact, reward learning, or incentive salience? Brain research Brain research
reviews 28, 309–369.
onini, L., Ferrari, P.F., 2011. Evolution of mirror systems: a simple mechanism for
complex cognitive functions. Annals Of The New York Academy Of Sciences
1225, 166–175.
onini, L., Rozzi, S., Serventi, F.U., Simone, L., Ferrari, P.F., Fogassi, L., 2010. Ven-
tral  premotor and inferior parietal cortices make distinct contribution to action
organization and intention understanding. Cerebral Cortex 20, 1372–1385.
ostan, A.C., Dum, R.P., Strick, P.L., 2010. The basal ganglia communicate with the
cerebellum. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America 107, 8452–8456.
ostan, A.C., Dum, R.P., Strick, P.L., 2013. Cerebellar networks with the cerebral cortex
and basal ganglia. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17, 241–254.
ower, J.M., 1997. Is the cerebellum sensory for motor’s sake, or motor for sen-
sory’s sake: the view from the whiskers of a rat? Progress in Brain Research 114,
463–496.
uccino, G., Binkofski, F., Fink, G., Fadiga, R., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., Seitz, R., Zilles,
K.,  Rizzolatti, G., Freund, H.J., 2001. Action observation activates premotor and
parietal areas in a somatotopic manner: an fMRI study. European Journal of
Neuroscience 13, 400–404.
uccino, G., Binkofski, F., Riggio, L., 2004. The mirror neuron system and action
recognition. Brain and Language 89, 370–376.
üchel, C., Coull, J.T., Friston, K.J., 1999. The predictive value of changes in effective
connectivity for human learning. Science 283, 1538–1541.
aligiore, D., Borghi, A.M., Parisi, D., Baldassarre, G., 2010. TRoPICALS: a compu-
tational embodied neuroscience model of compatibility effects. Psychological
Review 117, 1188–1228.
aligiore, D., Borghi, A.M., Parisi, D., Ellis, R., Cangelosi, A., Baldassarre, G., 2013.
How affordances associated with a distractor object affect compatibility effects:
a  study with the computational model TRoPICALS. Psychological Research 77,
7–19.vioral Reviews 37 (2013) 2504–2515 2513
Calvo-Merino, B., Grezes, J., Glaser, D., Passingham, R., Haggard, P., 2006. Seeing or
doing? Inﬂuence of visual and motor familiarity in action observation. Current
Biology 16, 1905–1910.
Caspers, S., Zilles, K., Laird, A.R., Eickhoff, S.B., 2010. ALE meta-analysis of action
observation and imitation in the human brain. NeuroImage 50, 1148–1167.
Castiello, U., Ansuini, C., Bulgheroni, M.,  Scaravilli, T., Nicoletti, R., 2009. Visuomotor
priming effects in Parkinson’s disease patients depend on the match between
the observed and the executed action. Neuropsychologia 47, 835–842.
Cattaneo, L., Rizzolatti, G., 2009. The mirror neuron system. Archives of Neurology
66, 557.
Cattaneo, L., Fasanelli, M.,  Andreatta, O., Bonifati, D.M., Barchiesi, G., Caruana, F.,
2012. Your actions in my cerebellum: subclinical deﬁcits in action observation
in patients with unilateral chronic cerebellar stroke. Cerebellum 11, 264–271.
Cheng, Y., Meltzoff, A.N., Decety, J., 2007. Motivation modulates the activity of the
human mirror-neuron system. Cerebral Cortex 17, 1979–1986.
Chersi, F., Ferrari, P.F., Fogassi, L., 2011. In: Meck, W.  H (Ed.), Neuronal chains for
actions in the parietal lobe: a computational model. PLoS One 6, e27652.
Chevalier, G., Deniau, J.M., 1990. Disinhibition as a basic process in the expression
of striatal functions. Trends in Neuroscience 13, 277–280.
Cisek, P., Kalaska, J.F., 2001. Common codes for situated interaction. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 24, 883–884.
Cisek, P., 2007. Cortical mechanisms of action selection: the affordance competition
hypothesis. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London—Series B:
Biological Sciences 362, 1585–1599.
Cisek, P., Kalaska, J.F., 2010. Neural mechanisms for interacting with a world full of
action choices. Annual Review of Neuroscience 33, 269–298.
Cisek, P., Kalaska, J.F., 2005. Neural correlates of reaching decisions in dorsal pre-
motor cortex: speciﬁcation of multiple direction choices and ﬁnal selection of
action. Neuron 45, 801–814.
Corbit, L.H., Balleine, B.W., 2011. The general and outcome-speciﬁc forms of
pavlovian-instrumental transfer are differentially mediated by the nucleus
accumbens core and shell. Journal of Neuroscience 31, 11786–11794.
Csibra, G., 2003. Teleological and referential understanding of action in infancy.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London - Series B: Biological
Sciences 358, 447–458.
D’Angelo, E., Casali, S., 2013. Seeking a uniﬁed framework for cerebellar function and
dysfunction: from circuit operations to cognition. Frontiers in Neural Circuits 6,
1–23.
D’Angelo, E., De Zeeuw, C.I., 2009. Timing and plasticity in the cerebellum: focus on
the granular layer. Trends in Neurosciences 32, 30–40.
Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., Rizzolatti, G., 1992. Understand-
ing motor events: a neurophysiological study. Experimental Brain Research 91,
176–180.
Dindo, H., Zambuto, D., Pezzulo, G. 2011. Motor simulation via coupled internal mod-
els using sequential Monte Carlo. In: Proceedings of IJCAI 2011, pp. 2113–2119.
Doya, K., 2000. Complementary roles of basal ganglia and cerebellum in learning
and motor control. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 10, 732–739.
Dum, R.P., Strick, P.L., 2003. An unfolded map of the cerebellar dentate nucleus
and its projections to the cerebral cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology 89,
634–639.
Evangeliou, M.N., Raos, V., Galletti, C., Savaki, H.E., 2009. Functional imaging of the
parietal cortex during action execution and observation. Cerebral Cortex 19,
624–639.
Fabbri-Destro, M.,  Rizzolatti, G., 2008. Mirror neurons and mirror systems in
monkeys and humans. Physiology (Bethesda, MD  23, 171–179.
Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., Rizzolatti, G., 2000. Visuomotor neurons: ambiguity
of the discharge or motor perception? International Journal of Psychophysiology
35 (2-3), 165–177.
Flanagan, J., Johansson, R., 2003. Action plans used in action observation. Nature 424,
769–771.
Flanagan, J.R., Vetter, P., Johansson, R.S., Wolpert, D.M., 2003. Prediction precedes
control in motor learning. Current Biology 13, 146–150.
Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P.F., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F., Rizzolatti, G., 2005. Pari-
etal  lobe: from action organization to intention understanding. Science 308,
662–667.
Friston, K.J., Frith, C.D., Passingham, R.E., Liddle, P.F., Frackowiak, R.S., 1992. Motor
practice and neurophysiological adaptation in the cerebellum: a positron
tomography study. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 248,
223–228.
Friston, K., Mattout, J., Kilner, J., 2011. Action understanding and active inference.
Biological Cybernetics 104, 137–160.
Frith, C.D., Blakemore, S., Wolpert, D.M., 2000. Explaining the symptoms of
schizophrenia: abnormalities in the awareness of action. Brain Research Reviews
31,  357–363.
Fuentes, C.T., Bastian, A.J., 2007. Motor cognition—what is it and is the cerebellum
involved? Cerebellum London England 6, 232–236.
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Rizzolatti, G., 2002. Action representation and the
inferior parietal lobule. In: Prinz, W.,  Hommel, B. (Eds.), Attention Performance
XIX  Common Mechanisms in Perception and Action, vol. 19. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, pp. 247–266.
Gallese, V., Goldman, A., 1998. Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-
reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2, 493–501.
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Rizzolatti, G., 1996. Action recognition in the pre-
motor cortex. Brain 119, 593–609.
Glickstein, M.,  2003. Subcortical projections of the parietal lobes. Advances in Neu-
rology 93, 43–55.
2 iobeha
G
G
G
G
G
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
I
I
I
I
I
J
K
K
K
K
K
K
L514 D. Caligiore et al. / Neuroscience and B
rafton, S.T., Tipper, C.M., 2012. Decoding intention: a neuroergonomic perspective.
NeuroImage 59, 14–24.
rèzes, J., Armony, J.L., Rowe, J., Passingham, R.E., 2003. Activations related to mirror
and canonical neurones in the human brain: an fMRI study. NeuroImage 18,
928–937.
rèzes, J., Decety, J., 2001. Functional anatomy of execution, mental simulation,
observation, and verb generation of actions: a meta-analysis. Human Brain Map-
ping 12, 1–19.
rossman, E., Donnelly, M.,  Price, R., Pickens, D., Morgan, V., Neighbor, G., Blake,
R.,  2000. Brain areas involved in perception of biological motion. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience 12, 711–720.
urney, K., Prescott, T., Redgrave, P., 2001. A computational model of action selection
in  the basal ganglia. I. A new functional anatomy. Biological Cybernetics 84,
401–410.
aarmeier, T., Bunjes, F., Lindner, A., Berret, E., Thier, P., 2001. Optimizing visual
motion perception during eye movements. Neuron 32, 527–535.
aber, S.N., Fudge, J.L., McFarland, N.R., 2000. Striatonigrostriatal pathways in pri-
mates form an ascending spiral from the shell to the dorsolateral striatum.
Journal of Neuroscience 20, 2369–2382.
amilton, A.F., Grafton, S.T., 2007. The Motor Hierarchy: From kinematics to Goals
and Intentions. In: Rossetti, Y., Kawato, M.,  Haggard, P. (Eds.), Sensorimotor
Foundations of Higher Cognition, 2007. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp.
381–408.
amilton, A.F., Grafton, S.T., 2006. Goal representation in human anterior intrapari-
etal  sulcus. Journal of Neuroscience 26, 1133–1137.
amilton, A.F., Wolpert, D.M., Frith, U., Grafton, S.T., 2006. Where does your own
action inﬂuence your perception of another person’s action in the brain? Neu-
roImage 29, 524–535.
amilton, A.F., Brindley, R.M., Frith, U., 2007. Imitation and action understanding in
autistic spectrum disorders: how valid is the hypothesis of a deﬁcit in the mirror
neuron system? Neuropsychologia 45, 1859–1868.
aslinger, B., Erhard, P., Weilke, F., Ceballos-Baumann, A.O., Bartenstein, P., Gräﬁn
Von Einsiedel, H., Schwaiger, M.,  et al., 2002. The role of lateral premotor-
cerebellar-parietal circuits in motor sequence control: a parametric fMRI study.
Brain Research 13, 159–168.
eyes, C., 2010. Where do mirror neurons come from? Neuroscience and Biobe-
havioural Reviews 34, 575–583.
offman, E.A., Haxby, J., 2000. Distinct representations of eye gaze and identity in
the distributed human neural system for face perception. Nature Neuroscience
3,  80–84.
oshi, E., Tremblay, L., Féger, J., Carras, P.L., Strick, P.L., 2005. The cerebellum com-
municates with the basal ganglia. Nature Neuroscience 8, 1491–1493.
ouk, J.C., 2011. Action selection and reﬁnement in subcortical loops through
basal ganglia and cerebellum. In: Seth, A., Bryson, J., Prescott, T. (Eds.), Mod-
elling Natural Action Selection. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK,
pp.  176–207.
ouk, J.C., Buckingham, J.T., Barto, A.G., 1996. Models of the cerebellum and motor
learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19, 368–383.
ua, S.E., Houk, J.C., 1997. Cerebellar guidance of premotor network development
and  sensorimotor learning. Learning & Memory 4, 63–76.
umphries, M.D., Prescott, T.J., 2010. The ventral basal ganglia, a selection mecha-
nism at the crossroads of space, strategy, and reward. Progress in Neurobiology
90,  385–417.
acoboni, M., 1999. Cortical mechanisms of human imitation. Science 286,
2526–2528.
acoboni, M.,  Koski, L.M., Brass, M.,  Bekkering, H., Woods, R.P., Dubeau, M.-C., Mazz-
iotta, J.C., et al., 2001. Reafferent copies of imitated actions in the right superior
temporal cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America 98, 13995–13999.
mamizu, H., Miyauchi, S., Tamada, T., Sasaki, Y., Takino, R., Putz, B., Yoshioka Kawato,
M.,  2000. Human cerebellar activity reﬂecting an acquired internal model of a
new  tool. Nature 403, 192–195.
to, M., 2008. Control of mental activities by internal models in the cerebellum.
Nature Reviews Neuroscience 9, 304–313.
zawa, J., Shadmehr, R., 2011. In: Körding, K. (Ed.), Learning from sensory and reward
prediction errors during motor adaptation. PLoS Computational Biology 7, 11.
acobson, G.A., Rokni, D., Yarom, Y., 2008. A model of the olivo-cerebellar system as
a  temporal pattern generator. Trends in Neurosciences 31, 617–625.
andel, E.R., Schwartz, J.H., Jessell, T.M. (Eds.), 2000. Neurology. Principles of Neural
Science, vol. 4. McGraw-Hill, New York, p. 1414.
eysers, C., Perrett, D.I., 2004. Demystifying social cognition: a Hebbian perspective.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8, 501–507.
ilner, J.M., Friston, K.J., Frith, C.D., 2007. Predictive coding: an account of the mirror
neuron system. Cognitive Processing 8, 159–166.
ilner, J.M., 2011. More than one pathway to action understanding. Trends in Cog-
nitive Sciences 15, 352–357.
im, S.G., Ugurbil, K., Strick, P.L., 1994. Activation of a cerebellar output nucleus
during cognitive processing. Science 265, 949–951.
oziol, L.F., Budding, D., Andreasen, N., D’Arrigo, S., Bulgheroni, S., Imamizu, H., Ito,
M.,  Manto, M.,  Marvel, C., Parker, K., Pezzulo, G., Ramnani, N., Riva, D., Schmah-
mann, J., Vandervert, L., Yamazaki, T. in press. Consensus paper: the cerebellum’s
role in movement and cognition. Cerebellum.
estou, V., Pollick, F.E., Kourtzi, Z., 2008. Neural substrates for action understanding
at  different description levels in the human brain. Journal of Cognitive Neuro-
science 20, 324–341.vioral Reviews 37 (2013) 2504–2515
Lewis, S.J.G., Dove, A., Robbins, T.W., Barker, R.A., Owen, A.M., 2004. Striatal contrib-
utions to working memory: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study in
humans. European Journal of Neuroscience 19, 755–760.
Levy, R., Friedman, H.R., Davachi, L., Goldman-Rakic, P.S., 1997. Differential acti-
vation of the caudate nucleus in primates performing spatial and nonspatial
working memory tasks. Journal of Neuroscience 17, 3870–3882.
Lisman, J.E., Grace, A.A., 2005. The hippocampal–VTA loop: controlling the entry of
information into long-term memory. Neuron 46, 703–713.
Mahon, B.Z., Caramazza, A., 2008. A critical look at the embodied cognition hypothe-
sis and a new proposal for grounding conceptual content. Journal of Physiology
(Paris) 102, 59–70.
Maioli, M.G., Squatrito, S., Battaglini, P.P., Rossi, R., Galletti, C., 1983. Projections
from the visual cortical region of the superior temporal sulcus to the striatum
and claustrum in the macaque monkey. Archives Italiennes De Biologie 121,
259–266.
Marceglia, S., Fiorio, M.,  Foffani, G., Mrakic-Sposta, S., Tiriticco, M.,  Locatelli, M.,
Caputo, E., et al., 2009. Modulation of beta oscillations in the subthalamic area
during action observation in Parkinson’s disease. Neuroscience 161, 1027–1036.
Matsumoto, K., Tanaka, K., 2004. The role of the medial prefrontal cortex in achieving
goals. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 14, 178–185.
Miall, R.C., 2003. Connecting mirror neurons and forward models. NeuroReport 14,
2135–2137.
Middleton, F.A., Strick, P.L., 1996. The temporal lobe is a target of output from the
basal ganglia. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America 93, 8683–8687.
Middleton, F.A., Strick, P.L., 1994. Anatomical evidence for cerebellar and basal gan-
glia involvement in higher cognitive function. Science 266, 458–461.
Middleton, F.A., Strick, P.L., 2000. Basal ganglia and cerebellar loops: motor and
cognitive circuits. Brain Research Reviews 31, 236–250.
Milak, M.S., Shimansky, Y., Bracha, V., Bloedel, J.R., 1997. Effects of inactivating
individual cerebellar nuclei on the performance and retention of an operantly
conditioned forelimb movement. Journal of Neurophysiology 78, 939–959.
Mink, J.W., 1996. The basal ganglia: focused selection and inhibition of competing
motor programs. Progress in Neurobiology 50, 381–425.
Mirolli, M.,  Mannella, F., Baldassarre, G., 2010. The roles of the amygdala in the affec-
tive regulation of body, brain and behaviour. Connection Science 22, 215–245.
Molinari, M.,  Chiricozzi, F.R., Clausi, S., Tedesco, A.M., De Lisa, M.,  Leggio, M.G.,  2008.
Cerebellum and detection of sequences, from perception to cognition. Cerebel-
lum London England 7, 611–615.
Montague, P.R., Hyman, S.E., Cohen, J.D., 2004. Computational roles for dopamine in
behavioural control. Nature 431, 760–767.
Mukamel, R., Ekstron, A.D., Kaplan, J., Iacoboni, M.,  Fried, I., 2010. Single-neuron
responses in humans during execution and observation of actions. Current Biol-
ogy 20, 750–756.
Nambu, A., 2004. A new dynamic model of the cortico-basal ganglia loop. Progress
in  brain research 143, 461–466.
Nambu, A., Tokuno, H., Takada, M.,  2002. Functional signiﬁcance of the
cortico–subthalamo–pallidal ‘hyperdirect’pathway. Neuroscience Research 43,
111–117.
Nelissen, K., Borra, E., Gerbella, M.,  Rozzi, S., Luppino, G., Vanduffel, W.,  Rizzolatti, G.,
et  al., 2011. Action observation circuits in the macaque monkey cortex. Journal
of Neuroscience 31, 3743–3756.
Oram, M.W.,  Perrett, D.I., 1994. Responses of anterior superior temporal polysensory
(STPa) neurons to biological motion stimuli. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
6,  99–116.
Oztop, E., Arbib, M.A., 2002. Schema design and implementation of the grasp-related
mirror neuron system. Biological Cybernetics 87, 116–140.
Pelphrey, K.A., Morris, J.P., McCarthy, G., 2004. Grasping the intentions of others:
the  perceived intentionality of an action inﬂuences activity in the superior tem-
poral sulcus during social perception. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16,
1706–1716.
Pezzulo, G., 2011. Grounding procedural and declarative knowledge in sensorimotor
anticipation. Mind and Language 26, 78–114.
Pezzulo, G., Castelfranchi, C., 2009. Thinking as the control of imagination: a concep-
tual framework for goal-directed systems. Psychological Research 73, 559–577.
Pezzulo, G., Candidi, M., Dindo, H., Barca, L., 2013. Action simulation in the human
brain: twelve questions. New Ideas in Psychology, in press.
Pezzulo, G., Dindo, H., 2011. What should I do next? Using shared representations
to  solve interaction problems. Experimental Brain Research 211, 613–630.
Press, C., Cook, J., Blakemore, S.-J., Kilner, J., 2011a. Dynamic modulation of human
motor activity when observing actions. Journal of Neuroscience 31, 2792–2800.
Press, C., Heyes, C., Kilner, J.M., 2011b. Learning to understand others’ actions. Biol-
ogy  Letters 7, 457–460.
Prinz, W.,  2006. What re-enactment earns us. Cortex 42, 515–517.
Poliakoff, E., Galpin, A., Dick, J., Moore, P., Tipper, S.P., 2007. The effect of viewing
graspable objects and actions in Parkinson’s disease. NeuroReport 18, 483–487.
Raichle, M.E., Fiez, J.A., Videen, T.O., MacLeod, A.M., Pardo, J.V., Fox, P.T., Petersen,
S.E., 1994. Practice-related changes in human brain functional anatomy during
nonmotor learning. Cerebral Cortex 4, 8–26.
Ramnani, N., Miall, R.C., 2004. A system in the human brain for predicting the actions
of  others. Nature Neuroscience 7, 85–90.Ramnani, N., Toni, I., Passingham, R.E., Haggard, P., 2001. The cerebellum and parietal
cortex play a speciﬁc role in coordination: a PET study. NeuroImage 14, 899–911.
Redgrave, P., Prescott, T.J., Gurney, K., 1999a. Is the short latency dopamine response
too  short to signal reward error? Trends in Neurosciences 22, 146–151.
iobeha
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
S
M
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
SD. Caligiore et al. / Neuroscience and B
edgrave, P., Prescott, T.J., Gurney, K., 1999b. The basal ganglia: a vertebrate solution
to  the selection problem? Neuroscience 89, 1009–1023.
izzolatti, G., Craighero, L., 2004. The mirror neuron system. Annual Review of Neu-
roscience 27, 169–192.
izzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., 2001. Neurophysiological mechanisms under-
lying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience
2,  661–670.
izzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V., Fogassi, L., 1996. Premotor cortex and the recog-
nition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research 3, 131–142.
izzolatti, G., Arbib, M.A., 1998. Language within our grasp. Trends in Neurosciences
21, 188–194.
omanelli, P., Esposito, V., Schaal, D.W., Heit, G., 2005. Somatotopy in the basal gan-
glia:  experimental and clinical evidence for segregated sensorimotor channels.
Brain research Brain research reviews 48, 112–128.
ozzi, S., Ferrari, P.F., Bonini, L., Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., 2008. Functional
organization of inferior parietal lobule convexity in the macaque monkey: elec-
trophysiological characterization of motor, sensory and mirror responses and
their correlation with cytoarchitectonic areas. European Journal of Neuroscience
28, 1569–1588.
ozzi, S., Calzavara, R., Belmalih, A., Borra, E., Gregoriou, G.G., Matelli, M., Luppino,
G.,  2006. Cortical connections of the inferior parietal cortical convexity of the
macaque monkey. Cerebral Cortex 16, 1389–1417.
axe, R., Xiao, D.-K., Kovacs, G., Perrett, D.I., Kanwisher, N., 2004. A region of right
posterior superior temporal sulcus responds to observed intentional actions.
Neuropsychologia 42, 1435–1446.
olnar-Szakacs, I., Kaplan, J., Greenﬁeld, P.M., Iacoboni, M.,  2006. Observing com-
plex action sequences: the role of the fronto-parietal mirror neuron system.
NeuroImage 33, 923–935.
chmahmann, J.D., 1998. Dysmetria of thought: clinical consequences of cere-
bellar dysfunction on cognition and affect. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2,
362–371.
chmahmann, J.D., Pandya, D.N., 1989. Anatomical investigation of projections to
the basis pontis from posterior parietal association cortices in rhesus monkey.
Journal of Comparative Neurology 289, 53–73.
chrimsher, G.W., Billingsley, R.L., Jackson, E.F., Moore, B.D., 2002. Caudate nucleus
volume asymmetry predicts attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
symptomatology in children. Journal of Child Neurology 17, 877–884.
chubotz, R.I., 2008. Predicting Events Without Miracle Neurons: Towards a Sober
Consideration of Brain Data. Constructivist Foundations 4, 25–26.
chultz, W.,  2002. Getting formal with dopamine and reward. Neuron 36, 241–263.
chubotz, R.I., von Cramon, D.Y., 2002. Predicting perceptual events activates corre-
sponding motor schemes in lateral premotor cortex: an fMRI study. NeuroImage
15,  787–796.
hadmehr, R., Krakauer, J.W., 2008. A computational neuroanatomy for motor con-
trol. Experimental Brain Research 185, 359–381.
okolov, A.A., Gharabaghi, A., Tatagiba, M.S., Pavlova, M.,  2010. Cerebellar engage-
ment in an action observation network. Cerebral Cortex 20, 486–491.
okolov, A.A., Erb, M.,  Gharabaghi, A., Grodd, W.,  Tatagiba, M.S., Pavlova, M.A., 2012.
Biological motion processing: the left cerebellum communicates with the right
superior temporal sulcus. NeuroImage 59, 2824–2830.
tein, J.F., Glickstein, M.,  1992. Role of the cerebellum in visual guidance of move-
ment. Physiological Reviews 72, 967–1017.
trick, P.L., Dum, R.P., Fiez, J.A., 2009. Cerebellum and nonmotor function. Annual
Review of Neuroscience 32, 413–434.
ynofzik, M.,  Lindner, A., Thier, P., 2008. The cerebellum updates predictions about
the  visual consequences of one’s behavior. Current Biology 18, 814–818.vioral Reviews 37 (2013) 2504–2515 2515
Tang, C., Pawlak, A.P., Prokopenko, V., West, M.O., 2007. Changes in activity of the
striatum during formation of a motor habit. European Journal of Neuroscience
25, 1212–1227.
Thill, S., Caligiore, D., Borghi, A.M., Ziemke, T., Baldassarre, G., 2013. Theories and
computational models of affordance and mirror systems: an integrative review.
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 37, 491–521.
Thoma, P., Bellebaum, C., Koch, B., Schwarz, M.,  Daum, I., 2008. The cerebellum
is involved in reward-based reversal learning. Cerebellum London England 7,
433–443.
Tremblay, F., Léonard, G., Tremblay, L., 2008. Corticomotor facilitation associated
with observation and imagery of hand actions is impaired in Parkinson’s disease.
Experimental Brain Research 185, 249–257.
Tyrrell, T., Willshaw, D., 1992. Cerebellar cortex: its simulation and the relevance of
Marr’s theory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London—Series
B:  Biological Sciences 336, 239–257.
Uithol, S., Van Rooij, I., Bekkering, H., Haselager, P., 2011. What do mirror neurons
mirror? Philosophical Psychology 24, 1–17.
Urgesi, C., Candidi, M.,  Ionta, S., Aglioti, S.M., 2007. Representation of body entity
and  body actions in extrastriate body area and ventral premotor cortex. Nature
Neuroscience 10, 30–31.
Verschure, P.F.M.J., Mintz, M.,  2001. A real-time model of the cerebellar circuitry
underlying classical conditioning: a combined simulation and robotics study.
Neurocomputing 38–40 (1–4), 1019–1024.
Volkow, N.D., Wang, G.-J., Newcorn, J., Telang, F., Solanto, M.V., Fowler, J.S., Logan, J.,
et  al., 2007. Depressed dopamine activity in caudate and preliminary evidence
of  limbic involvement in adults with attention-deﬁcit/hyperactivity disorder.
Archives of General Psychiatry 64, 932–940.
Voorn, P., Vanderschuren, L.J.M.J., Groenewegen, H.J., Robbins, T.W., Pennartz, C.M.A.,
2004. Putting a spin on the dorsal-ventral divide of the striatum. Trends in
Neurosciences 27, 468–474.
Weber, J.T., Yin, T.C., 1984. Subcortical projections of the inferior parietal cortex (area
7)  in the stump-tailed monkey. Journal of Comparative Neurology 224, 206–230.
Wilson, M.,  Knoblich, G., 2005. The case for motor involvement in perceiving con-
speciﬁcs. Psychological Bulletin 131, 460–473.
Wolpert, D.M., Miall, R.C., Kawato, M.,  1998. Internal models in the cerebellum.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2, 338–347.
Wolpert, D.M., Ghahramani, Z., Jordan, M.I., 1995. An internal model for sensorimo-
tor integration. Science 269, 1880–1882.
Wolpert, D., Doya, K., Kawato, M.,  2003. A unifying computational framework for
motor control and social interaction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London—Series B: Biological Sciences 358, 593–602.
Wolfensteller, U., Schubotz, R.I., von Cramon, D.Y., 2007. Understanding non-
biological dynamics with your own  premotor system. NeuroImage 36 (Suppl
2), T33–T43.
Xu, T., Yu, X., Perlik, A.J., Tobin, W.F., Zweig, J.A., Tennant, K., Jones, T., et al., 2009.
Rapid formation and selective stabilization of synapses for enduring motor
memories. Nature 462, 915–919.
Yamazaki, T., Tanaka, S., 2009. Computational models of timing mechanisms in the
cerebellar granular layer. Cerebellum London England 8, 423–432.
Yamazaki, T., Nagao, S., 2012. A computational mechanism for uniﬁed gain and
timing control in the cerebellum. PloS One 7, e33319–e33319.Yin, H.H., Knowlton, B.J., 2006. The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation. Nature
Reviews Neuroscience 7, 464–476.
Zahm, D.S., 2000. An integrative neuroanatomical perspective on some subcortical
substrates of adaptive responding with emphasis on the nucleus accumbens.
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 24, 85–105.
